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Introduction   
On 7 February 2007, the Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 
2007 was introduced into the Federal Parliament by the Minister for Human 
Services.  The purpose of the Bill was to introduce a Health and Social 
Services Access Card (the ‘Access Card’) by 20081 using smart card 
technology.  Registration for the card was to be required by all Australian 
citizens seeking entitlement to health and social service benefits.  The 
introduction of the Access Card would be within an Australian Government-
controlled framework of interoperable smart cards.  This structure may not 
necessarily have been accessed under the Human Services (Enhanced 
Service Delivery) Bill 2007, but it is certainly available for current and future 
government smartcard use. 
 
The Bill, passed by the House of Representatives on 28 February, and then 
introduced into the Senate on the same day, was adjourned and later 
withdrawn that same day. 
  
The Access Card and the Register (the database that supports the Access 
Card) both have the potential to permanently erode the established rights of 
Australian citizens to information privacy currently secured by the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth).  This paper analyses the detrimental impact of the Access 
Card on privacy with respect to three concerns:  the potential for function 
creep; that it is in all respects a quasi-identity card; and that it provides the 
opportunity for increased identity fraud and identity theft.   
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1  KPMG, Department of Human Services, Health & Social Services Smart Card Initiative   
Volume 1: Business Case Public Extract, Commonwealth of Australia, February 2006, at 
page 28 recommends a three and a half year timeframe for implementation:  18 months of 
planning, design and build; followed by a 24 month registration period, with start date in 
2008.  Registration process for the HSS system (KPMG, page 29) would be carried out in: 
Medicare offices (9.5 million expected); Centrelink officers (6.5 million expected). 
Structure of this paper 
The structure of this paper is as follows:  Part 1 provides an overview of the 
proposed Australian Government Health and Social Services Access Card 
(the ‘Access Card’) put forward in the Human Services (Enhanced Service 
Delivery) Bill 2007; Part 2 considers Australia’s existing public sector 
privacy regime; Part 3 provides a brief insight into ‘smart card technology’; 
Part 4 identifies and discusses the key legal issues associated with the 
proposed Access Card.  Finally, Part 5 provides some recommendations to 
better protect the privacy of prospective users of the Access Card if the 
legislation were to be progressed by a future government. 
 
Part 1 - Overview of the proposed Australian Government 
Health and Social Services Access Card and Register 
This paper refers to and analyses the key documents that have been used to 
progress the policy and legislative implementation of the Health and Social 
Services Access Card, including the Business Case prepared by KPMG, the 
Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007 (‘the Bill’), and the 
accompanying Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill.2 
 
Initiating the Health and Social Services Access Card and Register 
In October 2005, the Australian Government asked the Federal Minister for 
Human Services to submit a business case for the introduction of a health 
and services smart card that would replace the current Medicare Card, 
veterans’ health cards, and various Centrelink cards and vouchers, 
commencing as early as possible in 2007.3    
The Access Card Consumer and Privacy Taskforce was established by the 
(then) Minister for Human Services, the Hon Joe Hockey MP ‘in order to 
facilitate a process of community consultation about the issues raised by the 
Government’s Access Card and to open up additional lines of input to the 
Government’s final decision making…’4  
 
Why did the Australian Government seek to introduce the Access 
Card? 
The Bill5 provides that the objects of this Act are to reduce complexity of 
accessing Commonwealth benefits, including access for relief in emergency 
situations; to make this process more convenient, user-friendly and reliable; 
to reduce fraud on the Commonwealth with respect to benefits; and to permit 
                                                          
2  The terminology of the KPMG Business Case refers to ‘the Access Card’ and ‘the SCRS 
Database’.  This terminology of the Bill is that of ‘the Access Card’ and ‘the Register’.   
3  Summary of the outcomes to be achieved are from the KPMG Business Case, at pages 10 to 
12. 
4  Access Card Consumer & Privacy Taskforce, The Australian Government Health and Social 
Services Access Card, Discussion Paper Number 1, 15 June 2006, Available through the 
Department of Human Services Website, downloaded 9/08/06, at page 3. 
5  Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007, section 6. 
Access Card owners to use their Access Cards for ‘other lawful purposes 
they choose’.  The Bill expressly provides that ‘Access Cards are not to be 
used as, and do not become, national identity cards.’6   
 
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the implications of all the 
objects of the Bill.  This paper focuses on the objects of the capacity of the 
Bill to reduce fraud, and the likelihood of the Access Card becoming an 
identity card, despite the expressed intent of section 6.  Part 4 analyses both 
objects in detail with reference to the Bill. 
 
Will it be mandatory to have the Access Card? 
Although it was stated7 by the KPMG Business Case that registration for the 
Access Card will not be mandatory, and the Bill does not specifically 
address this issue, the reality is that in order to seek health and social 
security entitlements, it will become mandatory to register.   
 
The Bill links the requirement for registration, with entitlement to a broad 
range of health and social service benefits which means that most Australian 
citizens will need to register for the Access Card in order to be eligible for 
the entitlements.  The figure for anticipated registration from the KPMG 
Business Case was that ‘up to 16 million Australians’8 will need to be 
registered for entitlement.   The Bill operates as follows:  Section 7 provides 
that the purposes of the Act are to facilitate the provision of benefits and 
services to members of the public from participating agencies.  A 
‘participating agency’9 includes the Department of Human Services, the 
Department of Veteran Affairs, Medicare Australia, Centrelink, Australian 
Hearing Services, and Health Services Australia Limited.   In order to 
receive benefits or services from these services, the Access Card must be 
used, as required by Section 41, the Bill.  Section 22 provides that to be 
eligible for an Access Card, a person must be registered on the Register.    
 
Key components of the Human Services (Enhanced Services Delivery) 
Bill 2007                    
There are two key components to the Bill:  the Register and the Access Card. 
 
                                                          
6   The Bill, section 6(2). 
7  KPMG, Business Case at page 15.  KPMG outlined a number of ‘significant problems’ of a 
voluntary system, including, the continuation of a ‘legacy system’ and the negation of 
benefits linking to addressing fraud (KPMG, 14 – 15).  Slipped in among the ‘significant 
problems’ was the ‘great benefit of a uniform registration system’ that would offer ‘greater 
levels of certainty for government…’ 
8  KPMG, Business Case at  3. 
9  The Bill, section 5, ‘ Definitions’. 
1. The Register 
The Bill provides that registration requires a person to be eligible or 
qualified for a Commonwealth benefit, and not to already be registered.10  
Application is by written application in the form approved by the Secretary, 
and accompanied by ‘such other specified information’ that the Secretary 
determines is needed for the Secretary to be satisfied of the applicant’s 
identity.   
 
The Bill provides that once a person is registered, the Secretary must include 
on the Register the following information:  a person’s legal name;  date of 
birth;  citizenship or residency; indigenous status; sex; contact details, 
including residential address and postal address; benefit cards; registration 
status; details on the Access Card, if a person owns one; Department of 
Veteran Affairs information relating to pension; if a person was a prisoner of 
war; copies of the documents that were produced to prove identity and 
information about those documents if provided; details on the person’s 
relationship with any of the participating agencies; date of death; and other 
information including ‘other information that is determined by legislative 
instrument.’   
 
The Explanatory Memorandum11 states that: ‘The Register will be separate 
from the databases maintained by the various delivery agencies such as 
Centrelink, Medicare Australia and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and 
the other Human Services agencies.  There will be no centralised database 
holding all of an individual’s information in one place.  Existing agency 
records will remain with the relevant agency – where they are now.’  Despite 
this, the content of the Register clearly contains information that was created 
by many of these agencies (and others) including ‘Medicare number’, details 
of citizenship, details of indigenous status, and details of benefit cards.  It is 
likely that a person applying for registration would provide more 
information rather than less information, given the offences relating to 
applications for registration or Access Cards12 in which a person commits an 
offence for omitting ‘any matter or thing without which the statement is 
misleading’.   
 
2.  The Access Card 
An applicant for the Access Card must be at least 18, 13 although an 
exemption from this can be obtained.14  The applicant must be registered on 
the Register.15  Application for an Access Card similarly requires 
completion of an approved form.   
                                                          
 
10  The Bill, section 12. 
11   Explanatory Memorandum, 20. 
12  The Bill, sections 58 and 59. 
13  The Bill, section 22. 
14   The Bill, section 65. 
15   The Bill, section 22. 
An applicant must accompany the form with such other specified 
information or documents that are needed for the Secretary to be satisfied of 
a person’s identity.  These provisions match the requirement for proof of 
identity documents and information required for registration.   
 
Before an Access Card can be issued, an applicant must also attend an 
interview; have a photograph taken; provide their signature; and again the 
Secretary must be satisfied of the applicant’s signature.16  These three 
requirements are subject to exemption.17  The provision provides that ‘other 
requirements determined by legislative instrument may need to be satisfied’.  
The chance for future legislative amendment is discussed in Part 4.  The 
period of validity of the Access Card is 10 years.18 
 
The information on the Access Card is contained in two places:  the surface 
of the card;19 and in the Commonwealth’s area of the chip on the Access 
Card.20 
 
Information on the surface of the Access Card 
The Access Card must include the following information:  legal name of 
card owner; Access Card number; expiry date; photograph; signature; date 
of birth.  If the card owner chooses, information relating to the Department 
of Veteran Affairs information (including if the card owner was a prisoner of 
war) and details concerning blind disability support can be included on the 
surface. 
 
Information in the Commonwealth’s area of the chip in the Access Card 
The microchip in the Access Card will contain the following information:  
card owner’s legal name; date of birth; sex; residential address; photograph; 
signature; card number; expiry date; card PIN; benefit cards information; 
Medicare number; reciprocal Health Care Card number; emergency payment 
number (optional); registration status; Department of Veteran Affairs details 
(as provided in the Register); and statements required by legislation (no 
explanation is provided under the Explanatory Memorandum regarding these 
statements). 
 
The Bill has not included the following information that was originally 
discussed in the KPMG Business Case:  the ‘concession and safety net status 
flags’; ‘optional carer/legal custody status’; ‘optional organ donor status’; or 
‘optional personal health details (allergies, drug alert notifications and 
chronic diseases)’.    
 
                                                          
16  The Bill, section s 24(1)(f). 
17  The Bill, section 65. 
18  The Bill, section 26. 
19  The Bill, section 30. 
20  The Bill, section 34. 
Once issued, the successful applicant is held to ‘own’ their Access Card.21  
The concept of card ownership, is dealt with by the Bill, but not discussed in 
detail in this paper.   
 
Who will have access to information on the card?22 
The Bill23 provides the Secretary with the power to appoint ‘authorised 
persons’ who, if acting for the ‘purposes of this Act’ will not be committing 
offences relating to the Access Card or Register.  Appointments to be an 
‘authorised person’ are: a Commonwealth officer in a participating agency; 
24 a Commonwealth officer prescribed by the regulation; or an individual 
prescribed by the regulations.   
 
How will the card be implemented? 
Originally, the Governance and program implementation of the Access Card 
Project was25 proposed to be by a single implementation unit to be 
established and called the ‘HSS Smart Card Management Authority’.26  This 
authority was to include a board and a stakeholder advisory body comprised 
as follows:  Secretary of Department of Human Services; CEOs of Medicare 
and Centreline; Secretaries of agencies including: Prime Minister and 
Cabinet; Finance and Administration; Health and Ageing; Attorney 
General’s Department; Department of Family, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs; Federal Privacy Commissioner.  Also, an external firm 
(program management) to support the implementation of the project; and a 
stakeholder advisory body to report directly to the Minister and chaired 
independently.  The role will be to co-ordinate stakeholder advice; oversight 
of implementation and coordination; advise on business rules, with privacy 
considerations; advise on communication, education and training; advise and 
make recommendations on any proposed expansion to functionality and 
scope.’27 
 
The Bill has not implemented this Authority, instead, implementation is 
carried by the Minister (of the Department of Human Services), and the 
Secretary.  The Secretary carries responsibility for the establishment and 
maintenance of the Register, and for the issuance of the Access Cards.  The 
Bill28 also provides for the ‘administration of this Act to [be in] accord with 
Australian Government policy’.  The Bill allows the Minister, in 
consultation with the DVA Minister, to prepare a written statement of the 
policy of the Australian Government in relation to the administration of the 
                                                          
21  The Bill, section 37. 
22  KPMG, Business Case at 44 – 45. 
23  The Bill, s 72. 
24  Defined at s 5, the Bill to mean: the Department (Human Services), the DVA, the CEO of 
Medicare Australia, the CEO of Centrelink, Australian Hearing Services, Health Services 
Australia Limited. 
25  KPMG, Business Case at 30, 31. 
26  It is referred to by this name for the purpose of the Business Case.    
27 KPMG, Business Case at 30, 31. 
28  The Bill, section 8. 
Act, of which a copy may be given to the respective secretaries, and the 
statement must be laid before Parliament. If the Minister gives a copy to the 
secretary, then regard must be had to the statement in exercising powers and 
performing functions under the Act.  However, the Bill declares29 that such 
a statement is not a legislative instrument.  The Explanatory Memorandum30 
offers only the following assistance in interpreting the implications of this 
section; that ‘the provision is intended to allow the Minister to provide 
general high level guidance to the Secretary… about matters relevant to the 
administration of the Bill.’   
 
This method of administration is certainly narrower and less inclusive of the 
broader range of interests and points of view than the initial proposal of the 
‘HSS Smart Card Management Authority’.     
 
Part 2 – Australia’s existing privacy regime with particular 
reference to provision of health and social services  
 
The proposed Access Card will be introduced into a privacy regime 
predominantly established by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  The Bill also 
provides a number of mechanisms through which information privacy may 
be protected. 
 
1.  The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
The Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 reflects the Australian Government’s 
response to the international community’s recognition of privacy.  The Act 
acknowledges the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Article 17 regarding the right to privacy; and the OECD’s Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.  The 
Australian Government version of the Guidelines is provided in eleven 
Information Privacy Principles31 that relate only to the protection of privacy 
by government agencies.  In 2000, the Privacy Act 1988 was extended to 
cover (with exceptions) the private sector, achieved by the Privacy 
Amendment (Private Sector)  Act 2000.  The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has 
limited application32 to specified Commonwealth agencies and certain 
                                                          
29  The Bill, section 8(6). 
30  Explanatory Memorandum, at 16. 
31  The Act protects personal information privacy through the establishment of eleven 
Information Privacy Principles31 that are outlined in the Privacy Act 1988 s 14.   
32  Initially, the Act required only Commonwealth government agencies to comply with the 
eleven Information Privacy Principles.  An additional amendment to the Act made by the 
Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) has now extended the scope of the 
Act to include compliance by certain private sector organisations to ten National Privacy 
Principles, which are provided for in Schedule 3 of the Act.   
private sector organisations;33 and does not apply to the States or 
Territories.34   
 
The Act deals only with the protection of ‘personal information privacy’, 
defined35 as ‘information or an opinion (including information or an opinion 
forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a 
material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can 
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.’  This definition 
is sufficiently broad to cover personal information that forms part of a 
database and also personal information that is stored on a smart card, due to 
the wording ‘whether recorded in a material form not’.36     
 
Under the Privacy Act, the Access Card and Register would have been 
bound by the eleven Information Privacy Principles.  The Information 
Privacy Principles (‘IPPs’) relate to collection and use of data (IPPs 1, 2, 3, 
9, 10 and 11); storage and security of data (IPPs 4, 5 and 6); and accuracy of 
data (IPPs 7 and 8).   
Part 4 analyses how the Australian Government’s Access Card and Register 
would have breached its own existing privacy regime with respect to the 
principles relating to collection, use, disclosure and security and storage of 
personal information.37   The prospect of breaches of information privacy is 
heightened by the policy direction the Australian Government intends to 
adopt in its planned future use of smart card technology, not just with 
respect to health and social security entitlements, but by creating 
interoperability with smart cards used by all levels of government.   
 
2.  Protection of information privacy offered under the Bill 
The Bill offers some protection of information privacy; however analysis 
will show that this protection is flawed.  The protection offered under the 
Bill includes the following:  Requirement for consultation with the Privacy 
                                                          
33  Additional exemptions from application of the Act by both Commonwealth Government 
agencies and private sector organisations are provided under section 7B. 
34  New South Wales has the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 which 
makes provisions for Information Privacy Principles (Part 2); Privacy codes of practices 
and management plans (Part 3); Privacy Commissioner (Part 4); and a Privacy Advisory 
Committee (Part 7).  Victoria has the Information Privacy Act 2000 which makes 
provision for: Information Privacy Principles (Part 3); Codes of practice (Part 4); and a 
Privacy Commissioner (Part 7).  The Australian Capital Territory has the Information 
Privacy Act 2000 and the Northern Territory has the Information Act 2004.  Tasmania has 
the Personal Information Protection Act 2004. 
35  Section 6, Privacy Act 1988. 
36  The Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy Review, Issues Paper, 2006 at pages 545 
has raised the definition of ‘personal information’ and ‘sensitive information’ as items for 
review, particularly with new developments in technology that may make the definitions 
incomplete. 
37  If the Australian Government sought to contract out various aspects of the Access Card 
which resulted in an ‘organisation’ dealing with a prospective Access Cardholder’s 
‘personal information’ (or ‘sensitive information’), then the National Privacy Principles 
(Schedule 3) may have application.  This paper, however, does not cover an analysis of the 
Access Card under that circumstance. 
Commissioner; limitations on collection of information; limitations on use 
of information; and offence provisions related to use of the Access Card. 
 
(i)  Input from the Federal Privacy Commissioner 
The processes for registration on the Register and issuance of the Access 
Card allow only for a very narrow role for the Privacy Commissioner, in 
which consultation by the Privacy Commissioner is limited to commenting 
on the respective forms.  Failure to take into account any comments by the 
Privacy commissioner will not however affect the validity of the approval 
forms.38  Further, the consultative role of the Privacy Commissioner does 
not extend to any additional documentation that the Secretary has the power 
to require for the purposed of assessing an application.39  Neither is the 
Privacy Commissioner consulted on matters that relate to the Secretary’s 
request for ‘additional information or specified additional document’40 
needed to satisfy eligibility or proof of identity.   
                                                          
 
There are a number of opportunities throughout the Bill for which 
consultation with the Privacy Commissioner might be valuable, most 
notably, section 66 in which the Minister has the power to determine 
guidelines for decisions about identity.41  It is noted, however that that the 
guidelines must be made by legislative instrument which will allow scrutiny 
by Parliament.  The Federal Privacy Commissioner would have the 
advantage of offering expert advice on matters as they develop under the 
Bill.  
 
(ii)  Collection of information – limits on information that can be contained 
on the Register and on the Access Card. 
The Bill provides a statutory limitation on the information that can be 
contained on the Register42 and on the Access Card (on the surface,43 and on 
the microchip).44  However, the information that is listed as required to be 
provided on the Register45 and on the microchip of the Access Card46 is 
extensive, and includes personal information that has been collected for 
purposes not related to either health or social security purposes, for example 
personal information relating to citizenship and residency; and other identity 
documents.  The Register also requires a person to provide ‘sensitive 
information’ relating to their indigenous status and disabilities.    
38  The Bill, ss13, 23.   
39  The Bill, ss 13(4), 23(4).   
40  The Bill ss 17, 34. 
41  The identity guidelines are relevant for decisions under section 13(a)(b)(i) and 13(4)(b) that 
relate to applying for registration; section 14(c) that relates to registration; section 
23(2)(b)(i) and section 23(4)(b) that relate to applying for an Access Card; and section 
24(1)(f) relating to the issue of an Access Card. 
42  The Bill, s 20. 
43  The Bill, s 32. 
44  The Bill, s 36. 
45  The Bill, s 17, 19. 
46  The Bill, s 34. 
 
Given the statutory breadth of information required, the legislative limitation 
appears ineffective as a means of minimising information on the Register 
and Access Card.  The only express limitation regarding information on the 
Register and Access Card relates to if an applicant is included in the 
National Witness Protection Program.47 
The Register is expressly declared not to be ‘a legislative instrument’,48 as 
are determinations made by the Secretary concerning information to be 
provided regarding the Register and Access Card are expressly held not to 
be a legislative instrument.49  The Explanatory Memorandum50 provides that 
the Register and Access Card are administrative in character and that this is 
merely declaratory of that legal position.  This may have the effect of 
minimising scrutiny of Parliament over the content of the Register.   
 
Under both sections providing for information that must be provided,51 the 
Minister may determine by legislative instrument that other information is 
required for the purposes of the Act.  Although this means that possible 
expansions of information will require an amendment through Parliament, it 
also provides for expansions without the expert oversight initially proposed 
by the HSS Smart Card Management Authority.     
 
(iii)  Use of information  
The Bill provides for limits on the use of the Access Card in the following 
way.  A person to whom the card is issued may use the card for any lawful 
purposes they choose.52 Commonwealth officers in ‘participating agencies’ 
may only use an Access Card for purposes of the Bill or with the owner’s 
consent.53  Consent in this context is not defined as requiring consent to be 
in writing, or to be ‘informed consent’.  The Explanatory Memorandum54 
provide that ‘[t]he effect of the clause is to ensure that such officers are 
limited to using the Access Card to facilitate the provision of relevant 
benefits, services, programs and facilities.’  By comparison, there is no 
companion section that expressly protects the use of information on the 
Register from ‘use’ by participating agencies, in the same way that section 
40 seeks to protect use of the Access Card.   
4.  Security and storage of the information 
The Bill does not provide any express provisions relating to the quality of 
security and protection of information stored on either the Register or the 
microchip of the Access Card.  Instead the Bill provides for a series of 
offences that can be brought directly against persons who deal with Access 
                                                          
47  The Bill, ss 18(1), 35 respectively. 
48  The Bill, ss 16. 
49  The Bill, ss 17(2) and 34(2) respectively. 
50  Explanatory Memorandum at 20, 38. 
51  The Bill, ss 17, 34, at each Item 17(b). 
52  The Bill, s 40. 
53  The Bill, s41. 
54  Explanatory Memorandum, at 41. 
Cards, including Commonwealth officers.    However there is no express 
responsibility or duty upon the Secretary, or Minister to ensure the security 
and storage of the information on the Register and Access Card is of a 
particular standard.   
   
Part 3 – Brief outline of smart card technology and Australian 
Government Smartcard Framework for use of smart card 
technology 
 
3.1  About smart card technology  
The proposed Australian Government’s Access Card will use smart card 
technology.  The ‘form’ of the Access Card is to be determined by the 
Minister.55 The Explanatory Memorandum56 provides that ‘the new Access 
Card will be a smartcard… [i]t will contain an embedded microchip which 
will store information in a secure and safe manner.’  The Bill (at section 27) 
has been ‘drafted in a way which will not prevent the application of future 
technology which may be developed and which may provide additional 
security benefits to the card.’57 
 
Smart cards have been described in a 1995 report of the New South Wales 
Privacy Commission as being: 
 
…a plastic card, usually about the same size as a magnetic strip card that has 
electronic logic to store data and in some case a microprocessor that can process 
data.  Both of these types of cards can be in the form of a contact or contactless 
card.  A contact card has small metal contacts imbedded in it which when inserted 
into a smart card reader, transmits powers to the card and allows data to be 
transferred to or from the card... 
 
The smart card chip is capable of being compartmentalized into ‘open 
working, secret and super secret’.58 For example, the open compartment of 
the chip can contain details of the cardholder’s name and address, which can 
be accessed by anyone but not overwritten.  The working component can 
contain information about the cardholder such as their blood type.  The 
secret compartment can be accessed only the cardholder using a PIN.  
Finally, the super secret part contains the programs ‘placed there by the 
manufacturer and/or the issuer of the card… and can only be accessed by 
special codes usually only known by the chip manufacturer.’59  
 
                                                          
55 The Bill, s 27(4).  
56 Explanatory Memorandum, at 29. 
57 Explanatory Memorandum, at page 29. 
58 Federal Privacy Commissioner, Smart cards:  Implications for privacy, December 1995.  
Information Paper No. 4, at 7. 
59 Federal Privacy Commissioner, Smart cards:  Implications for privacy, December 1995 
Information Paper No. 4, at 7 
Smart cards offer true multi-functionality. Their ‘storage and processing 
capacities are impressive, and it is not unusual to find a smart card that is 
capable of performing up to fifty different functions.’60 
 
Given the Access Card’s capacity for personal information storage and 
access, it may be considered an ‘efficient policy decision’ to add additional 
components to the Access Card, once it has been established.  The Bill 
provides61 that ‘other information that is determined, by legislative 
instrument, by the Minister and that is for the purposes of this Act’, may also 
be included in the Commonwealth’s area of the chip in the Access Card.   
The Australian Government’s policy on smart cards establishes the 
requirement of ‘interoperability’ between all current and future smart card 
projects (discussed in detail in Part 3.2).  The Australian Government’s 
policy of ‘interoperability’ is an indication that the Access Card may become 
the platform upon which other government (and possibly commercial) 
information storage and retrieval functions will be housed.   Ownership of 
the Access Card is statutorily provided to the cardholder, 62 allowing the 
card owner to use their Access Card ‘for any lawful purpose’.63  It is 
possible for a commercial operator to offer other services that use the non-
Commonwealth part of the microchip.  
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 
2006 stated64 that smart card technology raises a number of privacy 
concerns.   These concerns include:  the lack of anonymity when making a 
smart card transaction; the ability to accumulate vast amounts of information 
about the activities of their users; and the ability to generate profiles based 
on this information.   
 
The Access Card will be used by a number of ‘participating agencies’.  
Without proper accountabilities, it will be difficult to determine 
responsibility for any breaches of privacy relating to it.  The existing privacy 
regime in Australia does not specifically address smartcard concerns.  The 
Council of Europe65 has introduced Guiding Principles for the Protection of 
Personal Data with Regard to Smart Cards that ‘sets out 11 principles to be 
taken into account by those who issue smart cards, as well as other 
participants in smart card systems, such as project designers and 
managers.’66   
                                                          
60 The Privacy Committee of New South Wales, Smart Cards: Brother’s Little Helpers, 
Report, No. 66, August 1995. 
61 The Bill, section 34(1), Item 17. 
62 The Bill, s 37. 
63 The Bill, s 40. 
64 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy,  Issues Paper, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2006, at 521. 
65 The Council of Europe introduced Guiding Principles for the Protection of Personal Data 
with Regard to Smart Cards, in 2004.  Further references to the Principles are at page 522, 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006. 
66 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy,  Issues Paper, Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2006, at 522. 
 
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) does not specifically address smart cards and 
may need to be amended to address the privacy implications associated with 
their use.  The Australian Government has failed to progress any legislative 
framework that will afford protection to privacy in a ‘smart card 
environment’.  The Bill does provide for a number of offences relating to the 
Access Card, however these offences relate directly to individuals (including 
Commonwealth officers) who, for example, deal with an Access Card 
contrary to the Bill.  The Bill provides no legislative framework for 
accountability or audit processes, or associated enforcement mechanisms 
that secure smartcard protections as a government responsibility.  Instead, 
the Bill deals with these issues only at the individual officer level. 
 
3.2  Australian Government’s Smartcard Framework   
The introduction of the Access smart card will fit within an Australian 
Government policy of use of smart cards, as outlined in the Australian 
Government Smartcard Framework, Responsive Government A New Service 
Agenda. 67  This is important because its policy of interoperability of smart 
card application provides the context for the operation of the Access Card.  
The Australian Government is clearly anticipating (not necessarily at the 
point of passage of this particular Bill, but at some point), the development 
of a network of linked smart cards potentially through all levels of 
government, and out into commercial organisations.  This ‘interoperability’ 
is clearly in breach of the existing privacy protections of the Privacy Act 
1988. 
 
The Smartcard Framework is ‘intended to inform and guide adoption of a 
uniform smart card technology platform for all levels of government in 
Australia.  The intention of the Smartcard Framework is to foster common 
interoperable68 technologies.  It provides an opportunity for establishing a 
                                                          
67 The set of documents is established by the Australian Government Information 
Management Office (AGIMO), June 2006 (the ‘Smartcard Framework ’).  Part B is the 
Smartcard Handbook in which an overview of smartcard technology in plain-English is 
explained.  Part C is the Standards and Model Specification which explains the technical, 
business, functional and architectural aspects of smartcards and interoperability are dealt 
with.  Part B is the Implementation Guideline in which the development of business cases 
for deploying smartcards and guidance for project management are explained (Smartcard 
Framework, A, p5). The vision of the Australian Government for the use of smartcards is 
that ‘smartcards will become steadily more important in Australia.’  The Smartcard 
Framework is intended ‘to facilitate clear thinking about implementation issues… to help 
agencies understand the business case for smartcards, and to promote standardisation and 
uniformity for the shared benefit of all government agencies.’ (Smartcard Framework, A 
at 8). 
68  The Smartcard Framework defines ‘interoperability’ as being ‘the ability to transfer and 
use information in a uniform and efficient manner across multiple organisations and 
information technology systems.  It underpins the level of benefits accruing to enterprises, 
government and the wider economy through e-commerce.’  This definition is taken from 
the Smartcard Framework, A page 11, ‘What is the Interoperability Technical Smartcard 
Framework?’ Australian Government Interoperability Smartcard Framework,Version 2, 
found at 
       <www.agimo.gov.au/publications/2005/04/agtifv2/what_is>. 
platform for future interoperability and to build in extensibility.69 The goals 
of the Smartcard Framework include delivering ‘consistency of smart card 
deployments within the Australian Government and promote national 
alliance and interoperability’ and to accommodate the ‘development of smart 
card applications (single or multiple) matched to business requirements.’70 
 
Part 4 – Three key legal issues associated with the Bill  
This paper focuses on three key legal issues:  Firstly, the potential for 
function creep regarding both the Access Card and the Register; secondly, 
the use of the Access Card as a quasi-identity card; and thirdly, the increased 
chance of identity fraud particularly with respect to the Register.     
 
4.1  Function creep  
The Access Card and the Register both have enormous capacities to store 
information and to link databases; there is the chance that the original 
function or purpose for which the Access Card was introduced may, by a 
series of legislative amendments be used for other purposes or functions that 
were not intended.   Although there are some legislative provisions in the 
Bill with the intention that function creep be (at least initially) limited, there 
is still the capacity for function creep. 
 
This paper firstly defines the term ‘function creep’, secondly identifies if 
there is the potential for function creep with the Access Card and Register; 
thirdly discusses why function creep may be an occurrence that as a society 
we need to be cautious of, and finally proposes how function creep can be 
prevented, or at best minimised.   
   
What is ‘function creep’?  
The Access Card Consumer and Privacy Taskforce in its Discussion Paper 
Number 1 define71 ‘function creep’, as:  
…the way in which new systems, which are introduced for one specific or stated 
purpose, evolve or morph over time to serve quite different purposes and usages.  
For example, driver’s licences were originally introduced to do nothing more than 
to indicate that a certain person was permitted to be in control of a certain type of 
motor vehicle – nothing more.  Today the driver’s licence has evolved into 
something entirely different and is used for a variety of purposes which have 
nothing to do with motor vehicles.  In many cases, it has assumed incrementally 
many of the characteristics of a comprehensive identity card.  [this article’s 
author’s emphasis]. 
 
                                                          
69  Smartcard Framework , at ii. 
70  Smartcard Framework , at A9. 
71  Smartcard Framework, at 22. 
Comments in response to the UK Identity Cards Act 2006, have remarked 
that with respect to function creep, ‘security features, such as subject-
privacy guarantees, are immensely difficult, if not impossible, to retrofit.’72  
 
Is there potential for ‘function creep’ with the Access Card? 
There is an inevitability that function creep will occur as evidenced in the 
provisions of the Bill, the capacity to store proof of identity documents, and 
in the Australian Government’s Smartcard Framework.   
 
1.  Provisions of the Bill 
The Bill itself provides an indication that the structure it proposes for the 
Access Card and Register may be open to subsequent amendment and 
expansion.  This is evident in the stated purposes of the Act; the objects of 
the Act; and the ability to require further information. 
 
The purpose of the Act 
The Bill73, states that ‘[t]he purposes of this Act are to facilitate the 
provision of benefits, services, programs or facilities to some or all members 
of the public (whether under a Commonwealth law or otherwise), where that 
provision involves a participating agency.’ 
 
There are three ways in which the purpose of the Act can be expanded 
through an amendment that may not overtly appear to be an expansion of 
purpose.  Firstly, there is no express limitation on the type or kind of 
‘benefits, services, program or facilities’ to which the Bill relates.  An 
amendment to include other ‘benefits’ would necessarily expand the Bill’s 
ambit and function.  Secondly, that such benefits may be provided under a 
‘Commonwealth law or otherwise’, potentially creates the opportunity to 
include non-Commonwealth benefits.  Might this include state or local 
government benefits?  There is no limiting information either within the Bill 
or the Explanatory Memorandum.   
 
Finally, the appearance of a limitation on the purpose is to be found at the 
end of the purpose provision through the involvement of ‘a participating 
agency’.   The definition of a ‘participating agency’ means the department; 
the DVA; Medicare; Centrelink; Australian Hearing Services; and Health 
Services Australia Limited.  An amendment to either this definition to 
include an additional department, agency or service automatically expands 
the breadth of the purpose of the Act.  Alternatively, it is possible to 
administratively expand the portfolio of ‘the department’ to encompass other 
purposes.   The Bill74 provides for legislative amendments to enable 
                                                          
72 Entitlement cards and identity fraud, Id Card Response, Stand, January 2003, 
<http://www.stand.org.uk/IdCardResponse.html,>, at 19. 
73 The Bill, s 7. 
74 The Bill, ss17(1) Item 17, 34(1) Item 17. 
additional information to be required as part of the application processes for 
the Register and the Access Card.  If the list of ‘participating agencies’ were 
to be expanded, then the respective sections above can be amended to 
support the collection of additional information required.    
 
The objects of the Act 
The final object of the Act (coupled with other provisions) foreshadows the 
inclusion of commercial functions being included in the Access Card.  The 
first four objects of the Act deal with reducing complexity, improving 
convenience; reducing fraud; and improving access.  The final object relates 
to permitting ‘Access Card owners to use their Access Cards for such other 
lawful purposes they choose’.75  Vesting ownership of the Access Card in 
the cardholder, 76 and permitting use of the card for all lawful purposes, 77 
provides the foundation for the Australian Government to allow the card to 
be used for other purposes including identification purposes or for the non-
Commonwealth part of the microchip to be utilised for commercial 
purposes.   
 
 
Opportunities for data-matching 
The Taskforce is similarly concerned about the potential for function creep; 
in its Discussion Paper it is noted that, ‘Although the Secure Customer 
Registration Service [the Register] will be established separate from the 
databases administered by participating agencies, its existence may place 
greater pressures on Government to expand data-matching  
exercises.’ 78 
 
As the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Review of Privacy, Issues 
Paper79 notes data-matching: 
 
is currently conducted regularly in Australia, particularly by government agencies.80  
Data-matching can be conducted for a number of purposes, including detecting errors 
and illegal behaviour, to locate individuals, to ascertain whether a particular individual 
is eligible to receive a benefit and to facilitate debt collection.   
 
The reasons may be laudable, however the privacy implications may long 
term, be negative.    
                                                          
75 The Bill, section 6(e). 
76 The Bill, section 37. 
77 The Bill, section 40. 
78 Access Card Consumer & Privacy Taskforce, The Australian Government Health and 
Social Services Access Card, Discussion Paper Number 1, at page 22. 
79 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy Review, Issues Paper, 2006, at page 534 to 
537. 
80 ibid, quoting R Clarke, ‘Computer Matching by Government Agencies: The Failure of 
Cost/Benefit Analysis as a Control Mechanism’ (1995) 4 Information Infrastructure and 
Policy 29, 30. 
 
The Federal Office of the Privacy Commissioner released a detailed report81 
on the handling of Medicare and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme claims 
information which was released in August 2006.  In this report it was stated 
that it was a ‘statutory requirement that … the Guideline [required] the 
separation of Medicare and PBS claims information.’  The report highlighted 
the privacy implications for combining two databases dealing with Medicare 
claims and pharmaceutical benefit claims.  The combination of the two 
databases has the potential to create a detailed profile of an individual 
relating to highly sensitive health information. 
 
The Medicare/Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme claims information database 
is one example of a database which, for privacy reasons, requires that 
information within a single portfolio must be kept separately.   An audit 
(including reviews and updates) of databases may need to be undertaken to 
ensure that the combination of databases within (or without) a portfolio or 
department may need to be kept separately to avoid privacy implications.  
The pressure of ensuring ‘efficiencies’ may lead the Australian Government 
to (in the future) combine such databases.   
 
The Bill requires that information (‘as is determined by the Secretary’) about 
a PBS Entitlement Card and PBS Safety Net Concession cards are included 
on both the Register and on the Commonwealth part of the microchip.82  
There are no express statutory provisions limiting the use and disclosure of 
that information such that might be expected following the Federal Privacy 
Commissioner’s report83 on the handling of Medicare and the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. 
   
2.  Storing proof of identity documents 
Proof of identity documents will be scanned into, and stored by the Register 
as described.  This requirement will breach IPP 1, requiring information 
collected to be directly related to that purpose, and IPP9, that information 
obtained for a particular purpose cannot be used for another purpose, 
without consent.  This series of breaches will occur because documents used 
for proof of identity, such as driver licence, or passport, relate to information 
required for another purpose, that is, for the purpose of driving a vehicle, 
and for the purpose of entry into, and exit from Australia.   
 
Once the information is scanned and stored, then access to this broader 
information, that is unrelated to information necessary to obtain Access Card 
related services can be used in breach of IPP 10, or disclosed in breach of 
IPP11. 
                                                          
81 Report of the Privacy Commissioner’s Review of the Privacy Guidelines for the Handling of 
Medicare and PBS claims information, August 2006, at 27. 
82  The Bill, sections 17 Item 7, and 34 Item 10, respectively. 
83 Report of the Privacy Commissioner’s Review of the Privacy Guidelines for the Handling of 
Medicare and PBS claims information, August 2006, at 27. 
 
A more fundamental question is why is the proof of identity required of such 
a high standard?  The Australian Government in providing entitlements need 
only know that the person is duly entitled, and that there remains continuity 
in the identity of the person they are dealing with.   
 
3.  The Smartcard Framework 
The Smartcard Framework indicates a planned network of ‘infrastructure’ in 
the form of smart cards into which government at all levels will be linked.  
Already, the Smartcard Framework has anticipated the Queensland 
Government’s proposed ‘New Queensland Driver Licence’ project in which 
all licensed road users’ information (including personal information, road 
traffic information, criminal records) will be linked into the Australian 
Government’s Smartcard Framework.   
 
The combination of the possibility for extended functionality permissible by 
the Bill that may allow extensive public sector and private sector 
participation; the capacity of the Register to store and retrieve 
documentation beyond health and social service related personal 
information; and the proposed use of interoperable technologies necessarily 
leads to the conclusion that the Access Card will, if implemented, be used at 
some point in time for many more purposes than it was originally intended.  
 
Is ‘function creep’ a bad thing? 
Daniel Solove in ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’84 discusses the issues of the 
ability of government to seek personal information and to maintain it on 
databases.  He asks: ‘What is the concern?  The data was already in the 
record systems of government agencies.  Why is it a problem for the 
government to combine it into one gigantic database?’ 
 
The problem is one that I have called ‘aggregation’...Aggregation is the gathering 
together of information about a person.  A piece of information here or there is not 
very telling.  But when combined together, pieces of data begin to form a portrait 
of a person.  The whole becomes greater than the parts.  This occurs because 
combining information creates synergies.  When analysed, aggregated information 
can reveal new facts about a person that she did not expect would be known about 
her when the original, isolated data was collected. 
 
The implications of this for the Access Card are that it is possible that 
sensitive information is capable of becoming apparent through the 
‘aggregation’ of expanding amounts of personal information through the 
Register.  In fact, the Bill does not address the concept of ‘sensitive 
information’ either through its definitions or via any means of protecting this 
information.  It compulsorily requires information that directly relates to 
                                                          
84  Solove DJ, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’, 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, (3), 
January 2006, at 505. 
sensitive information (for example, indigenous information, health 
information), but does not require a standard for protecting that information. 
 
The Australian Privacy Foundation85 in its submission asserts that: 
 
Administration of health benefits unavoidably involves information relating to 
health care delivered, much of which is highly sensitive, it is for this reason that 
health administration information has been subject to specific privacy rules 
designed in part to quarantine it from other areas of public administration.   
 
Further, the importance of ‘function creep’ becomes heightened as Solove 
comments: 86 
…aggregation’s power and scope are different in the Information Age: the data 
gathered about people is significantly more extensive, the process of combining it 
is much easier, and the computer technologies to analyse it are more sophisticated 
and powerful. 
 
In terms of the Access Card, coupled with the Australian Government’s 
Smartcard Framework, the capacity to aggregate information (not just 
personal information, but also cross-referenced information) from all levels 
of government and possibly commercial organisations becomes a possibility.  
Will the legislative safeguards of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) that limit 
collection, use and disclosure be effective?  These safeguards will not occur 
at the state or local level where the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 does 
not apply.  In states where privacy is legislated for87 then additional 
protections will be available.  In states such as Queensland reliance for 
protection is limited to a mere administrative guideline, Information 
Standard 42.88   
 
Can function creep be prevented, and if so how? 
The Taskforce Discussion Paper recommends89 that function creep may be 
kept in check by ‘specifying the exact purposes for which the Access Card is 
to be introduced…equally to specify the purposes for which it cannot be 
used…’90  The Bill has not implemented the latter recommendation.   
                                                          
85  Australian Privacy Foundation, Response to the Taskforce Discussion Paper No. 1, at 13. 
86  Solove, above note 84, at 506. 
87  New South Wales has the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 which 
makes provisions for Information Privacy Principles (Part 2); Privacy codes of practices 
and management plans (Part 3); Privacy Commissioner (Part 4); and a Privacy Advisory 
Committee (Part 7).  Victoria has the Information Privacy Act 2000 which makes 
provision for: Information Privacy Principles (Part 3); Codes of practice (Part 4); and a 
Privacy Commissioner (Part 7).  The Australian Capital Territory has the Information 
Privacy Act 2000 and the Northern Territory has the Information Act 2004.  Tasmania has 
the Personal Information Protection Act 2004.   
88  Queensland Government Information Architecture, Information Standard 42, Information 
Privacy Guidelines, V1.00.00. 
89  Access Card Consumer & Privacy Taskforce, The Australian Government Health and 
Social Services Access Card, Discussion Paper Number 1Taskforce, at page 22. 
90  Ibid, at page 22. 
 
The Federal Privacy Commissioner in 1995 outlined guidelines91 on how the 
privacy principles should be incorporated into smart card projects: 92    
 The purposes for which the card can be used must be settled at the beginning of 
the project’s development; all parties to the smart card project should be identified 
at the beginning of the project; card holders must be advised before there are any 
changes to the smart card system (such as the introduction of new features) that 
affect the collection and use of personal information; their consent – real, informed 
consent93 – must be obtained to participate in the new arrangements.   
 
A brief analysis of the Bill (specifically the Access Card) in terms of these 
guidelines indicates that the ability to prevent function creep will become 
increasingly difficult to prevent, or to ‘retrofit’. 
 
The purposes for which the card can be used must be settled at the beginning of the 
project’s development. 
 
As discussed, the purposes of the Bill in relation to both the Access Card and 
Register are established in provisions that are open-ended and clearly will 
permit additional purposes to be considered (including commercial 
purposes).   
 
All parties to the smart card project should be identified at the beginning of the 
project. 
 
The parties authorised94 to participate in the use of the Access Card have not 
been clearly identified.  The Federal Privacy Commissioner’s guideline 
recommends all parties should be identified.  For the Access Card this 
would include all government agencies; all commercial entities; and all 
parties involved in manufacturing/producing the smart card and the 
database.   
 
Card holders must be advised before there are any changes to the smart card 
system (such as the introduction of new features) that affect the collection and use 
of personal information. 
                                                          
91  This approach is consistent with the data protection laws that have been developed from the 
OECD Guidelines on Transborder flows of personal data, and expressed in academic 
journals, including, Donna Bain’s Article: Smart cards: a federal privacy perspective 
(outlining the Australian Privacy Commissioner’s approach, in which transparency of the 
project is required, that would require all parties to be defined; and limits on collection and 
use’; Gerrit Hornung’s article: Biometric Identity cards, at 50, general principles of data 
protection law require the purpose of the data has to be specified before it is collected and 
the subsequent use is restricted to those purposes; unless the consent of the data subject or 
the law provide for this use.  
92 Federal Privacy Commissioner, Smart cards: Implications for privacy, Information Paper 
Number 4, December 1995, at 3. 
93 The Canadian approach is to treat consent to each of these aspects – ‘collection’, ‘use’ and 
disclosure’ as distinct and separate. 
94 The Bill, s 72. 
The Bill does not address the possibility of how cardholders might be 
informed of any proposed changes to the Access Card.    
 
Their consent – real, informed consent – must be obtained to participate in the new 
arrangements.  
 
The KPMG Business Case discussed ‘consent’ in terms of the Australian 
public not being required to obtain the Access Card; that it would not be 
mandatory to apply for the card.  However, the reality is that most 
Australians, who are eligible to entitlements under existing Medicare 
legislation and social security legislation, will seek continued entitlement 
under the Bill which requires registration prior to obtaining an Access Card.  
In turn, an Access Card is necessary in order to obtain a benefit.  There is no 
real opportunity to negotiate on aspects of registration. 
 
Whether or not there is ‘consent – real, informed consent’ to the original 
scheme is doubtful.  In terms, therefore of ‘consent’ to any ‘new 
arrangements’, it is unlikely that the consultation process to deliver ‘real, 
informed consent’ will improve to ensure such a high order consent. 
 
From this analysis there is a high probability that the Access Card and 
Register will ‘evolve so that it will be used for purposes for which [it] was 
not designed, that never could have been envisaged at the time of [the] 
system[’s] creation’.95 
 
The only means to protect against ‘function creep’ is to pass legislation that 
cannot be amended without a majority approval of the electorate.  The 
inclusion of a ‘prohibited use and disclosure’ clause as recommended by the 
Taskforce, may also offer protection.  With respect to the Bill, this would 
require an express prohibition on expanding the personal information that 
can be collected, the use of that information, and access to that information.  
The Bill as currently drafted does not provide this protection.   
 
4.2  Quasi-identity card 
This section considers the issue of whether or not the Access Card is in fact 
an identity card.   
 
What is an ‘identity card’? 
The features of the Access Card that most strongly suggest an identity card 
include the single universal identifier, for example the unique number that 
will be assigned to every individual who seeks to claim entitlement under 
the Bill coupled with the photograph on the Access Card. 
 
                                                          
95 Entitlement cards and identity fraud, Id Card Response, Stand, January 
2003<http://www.stand.org.uk/IdCardResponse.html>  at 19. 
How the Bill treats the Access Card in terms of being an identifier 
The objects of the Act expressly state, ‘that Access Cards are not to be used 
as, and do not become, national identity cards.’ 96   The Bill provides that 
‘[y]ou are not required to carry your Access Card at all times’, 97, 98 and the 
offence provisions make it an offence to require production of an Access 
Card for identification.99  However, the Bill also provides that a card-owner 
may use their Access Card for any lawful purpose. 100  The Explanatory 
Memorandum acknowledges that ‘the Access Card is not a national identity 
card and is not intended to be used as a national identity card…However; if 
individuals choose to use the card for identity purposes they may do so.’ 101    
 
Despite the legislative declarations that the Access Card is not intended to 
become a national identity card, there are three aspects that will almost 
certainly mean the Access Card will become used as such.  The three aspects 
are:  the strengthened proof of identity; the inclusion of the photograph on 
the surface of the Access Card; and the requirement to register and to obtain 
an Access Card in order to obtain benefits.   
 
1.‘Strengthened proof of identity’ 
The concept of ‘strengthened proof of identity’102 was initially discussed in 
considerable detail in the KPMG Business Case that envisaged consumers 
would provide substantial documentation, that they register and have their 
photo taken and that these photos would be matched with their scanned 
documentation.  The Bill has implemented the ‘strengthened proof of 
identity’ throughout the provisions dealing with registration103 and obtaining 
an Access Card104 that require the production of information or documents 
‘needed for the Secretary to be satisfied of your identity’.  Both provisions 
enable the Secretary to request additional documentation ‘for the Secretary 
to be satisfied of your identity’.105  The Minister is required106 to prepare 
‘identity guidelines’ that the Secretary must take into account when making 
specified decisions relating to identity.   
 
                                                          
96 The Bill, s 6(2). 
97 The Bill, s 42. 
98 The House of Representatives moved that Clause 42 of the Bill be amended to provide that 
a person is not required to carry their card ‘at any time’, not just ‘at all times’. 
99 The Bill, s 45. 
100 The Bill, s40. 
101 Explanatory Memorandum, at 14. 
102  This was acknowledged by the KPMG, Business Case at 30, also under part 7, ‘proof of 
identity’, in which parallel development of a national identity policy with the Attorney 
General’s Department is discussed. 
103  The Bill, s 13. 
104  The Bill, s 23. 
105  The Bill, ss 13(4), 23(4). 
106  The Bill, s 66. 
However, not all Australian citizens will be able to meet the proof of identity 
standards, for example the homeless.107  The Bill has attempted to provide 
for this by creating a system of marking on the Register and on the 
microchip of the Access Card whether an applicant’s proof of identification 
is determined to be ‘full’ or ‘interim’.108 This raises the concern that the dual 
status will result in a tiered citizenry for cardholders of bearing annotated 
Access Cards. 
 
2.  The photograph 
The Bill provides for the storage and display of an applicant’s photograph, 
subject to certain exemptions.109   The Register will contain the photograph 
of the registrant that appears on the surface of the Access Card (if one is 
taken), and ‘a numerical template of you derived from that photograph.’110 
The surface of the Access Card will contain the cardholder’s photograph.111  
The Commonwealth’s area of the microchip in the Access Card will also 
include the cardholder’s photograph as it appears on the surface of the 
Access Card.112 
 
The reference in the Bill to the ‘numerical template’ is the implementation 
of the KPMG recommendation of the use of a ‘facial biometric template in 
order to identity duplicate registrants prior to issuing a card.’ 113     
 
The inclusion of the photograph on the face of the Access Card, as well as 
on the microchip, was considered by the KPMG Business Case to be an 
advantage to increase the potential of the card to be relied upon by non-
Department of Human Service officers, including commercial organisations, 
to use the card as an identifier. 114   For the purposes of the Department of 
Human Services who have access to the database, and presumably card 
readers that allow access to the microchip that also contains a photograph of 
the cardholder, the photograph on the face of the card is unnecessary.   
 
                                                          
107  KPMG, Business Case at 30. 
108  The Bill, ss 17(1) Item 8, 34(1) Item 8. 
109 The Bill, s 65(5) allows for certain exemptions from requirements including the 
requirement to have a photograph taken.  Exemptions are not legislative instruments: see s 
65(6).  The Explanatory Memorandum provides at 58 that ‘the general rule in the Bill is 
that individuals wanting to obtain an Access Card will need to have their photograph 
taken’.  The Explanatory Memorandum acknowledge that it may not be possible for all 
requirements necessary for the Access Card will be able to be met, for example, attending 
an interview, having a photograph taken, or providing a signature.  The Bill refers to the 
exemption concerning the photograph with reference to the issuance of the Access Card at 
s 24(1)(c).  It is not entirely clear that the exemption will also apply to the Register.  The 
Bill requires at s 17(1) Item 9, that ‘if you own an Access Card… if your photograph is on 
the surface of your Access Card – that photograph and a numerical template of you 
derived from that photograph.’ 
110 The Bill, s 17(1) Item 9(f).   
111 The Bill, s 30 Item 4.  
112 The Bill, s 34(1) Item 5. 
113 KPMG, Business Case at 17. 
114 Ibid. 
However, it is the inclusion of the photograph on the Register that has the 
most significant privacy implications because it provides greater potential 
for the Australian Government’s ability to identify and monitor an 
individual’s activities beyond what is necessary for the provision of health 
and social service entitlements.  The Australian Law Reform Commission in 
its Review of Privacy, Issues Paper outlined115 a number of privacy 
concerns relating to the use of biometric technologies that allow 
‘behavioural or physiological attributes of people to be used for 
identification and authentication’.116   
der that Act.    
                                                          
 
For example, with respect to the photograph stored on the Register 
recordings of individuals taken from public video surveillance can be used to 
match the identity of registrants.  This can occur without the individual’s 
knowledge or consent.  Also, there is the potential to deduce from the 
photograph sensitive information117 about an individual (for example, health 
or religious information).  The exemptions from providing the photo given 
under the Bill118 do not provide any indications as to the particular grounds 
for the exemptions, and the Explanatory Memorandum119 refer to only 
general grounds for how the administrative power to exempt might be 
exercised.   
 
A Biometrics Institute Privacy Code120 was recently approved by the 
Federal Privacy Commissioner.  The Code containsthree new information 
privacy principles that relate to: biometric information to be de-identified; 
enrolment in biometric systems to be voluntary; and individuals to be 
informed of the purposes for which a biometric system is deployed.121   The 
new information privacy principles might be better contained in the Privacy 
Act 1988, where it would have the force of law, and one would have access 
to the remedies un
 
3.  Requirement to register for the card 
A key element of identity cards is that they are a ‘universal identifier’.  
Universality implies necessarily that there is a mandatory element in being 
so identified.  The Bill provides registration of the card will be required to 
obtain the benefits and facilities of the participating agencies which will 
make the card almost universally required by Australian citizens. 
 
115 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006, at 525 – 526.  
116 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006, at 523. 
117Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006, at 525. 
118 The Bill, section 65. 
119 Explanatory Memorandum, at 58. 
120 I Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006, at 526 
referring to ‘K. Curtis (Privacy Commissioner), ‘Privacy Commissioner Approves 
Biometrics Institute Privacy Code’ (Press Release, 27 July 2006). 
121 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006, at 526. 
Is the Access Card an identity card?  
Professor Graham Greenleaf in his article, ‘Quacking like a duck: The 
national ID card proposal (2006) compared with the Australia Card (1986 – 
87)’ undertook a comprehensive comparison of key features of the Access 
Card with the Australia Card.  The comparison compared the following five 
criteria:  A universal, compulsory ID card (compulsion and coverage);122 
card content;123 the national registration database and access to it;124 uses of 
the card125 and ID number by various sectors; and card-holder’s rights and 
uses.126   
 
Professor Greenleaf concluded that ‘it is clear that almost all the features 
present in the Australia Card system are present in the 2006 proposal.  In 
fact, the resemblances are often striking.’  The key differences between the 
two cards were with respect to the smart card technologies that are available 
in 2006, which were acknowledged to be a greater threat to privacy than the 
technologies available in 1986.  
 
Implications of an identity card for human rights 
Whether or not it is acknowledged that the Access Card is indeed an identity 
card, a number of human rights issue flow from the fact that a government is 
readily able to identify its citizens and record their activities.   
 
The right to privacy and the right to information privacy provided for in 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
underpin a number of other human rights that will be compromised without 
the former right.   For example, other rights that may be negatively impacted 
with the loss of the right to information privacy include:  the right to self-
determination; the right to liberty of movement; the right to freedom of 
thought; the right to hold opinions without interference; the right to freedom 
of expression; the right to freedom of association. 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Review of Privacy, states that:127 
 
the introduction of a unique multi-purpose identifier changes fundamentally the 
relationship between the individual and the government.128  In liberal democratic 
                                                          
122 Greenleaf G, ‘Quacking like a duck: The national ID Card proposal (2006) compared with 
the Australia Card (1986 – 87), viewed on the Cyberspace Law & Policy Centre website< 
http://www.cyberlawcentre.org>, at Table 1, page 2 deals with a comparison of:  
Compulsion and coverage: whether the card is compulsory; requirement to carry the card; 
possible confiscation of the card; registration requirements. 
123 Ibid, see Table 2, page 4 that compares the following elements:  identification number; 
card face data; card storage capacity; data on magnetic strip; data on chip (that is both 
compulsory to provide and that is optional to provide); data related to security. 
124 Ibid, see Table 3, page 6 – the central computer system, card readers and networking, in 
which the following aspects of both cards are compared: central computer system and 
content; linked computer systems/access to Register. 
125 Ibid, see Table 4, page 8 – Uses of the Card and ID number by various sectors. 
126 Ibid, see Table 5, page 9 – Card-holder’s rights and uses. 
127 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Privacy, Issues Paper, 2006, at page 556. 
societies governments are accountable to their citizens.  It is argued that the 
introduction of a unique multi-purpose identifier symbolically reverses this tradition, 
making citizens accountable to their governments.129 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission comment130 that use of such 
identifiers, ‘increases the ability of the state to monitor the activities of its 
citizens… [and] [t]he ability of a government to compile dossiers of personal 
information about an individual could have a ‘chilling effect’ on the 
activities of the government’s citizen who no longer has a private sphere’131 
 
It is difficult to quantify the importance of ‘anonymity’ and the role it plays 
in a democratic society.  Conversely, the Australian Government has been 
able to readily (although not necessary accurately) put a figure on the 
efficiencies to be gained from implementing the Access Card in terms of 
minimising entitlement fraud.  Efficiencies are always there to be gained or 
worked towards as a government goal; however, once anonymity is lost, the 
associated rights this concept is allied with such as the right to vote, the right 
to free speech, the right to freely associate, become increasingly difficult to 
regain.    
 
If the Access Card has all the features of an identity card, then the requisite 
debate on an identity card is needed, and the establishing legislation must 
recognise the Access Card as such.   
 
4.3  Identity fraud  
One of the objects of the Bill132 is to reduce fraud on the Commonwealth in 
relation to the provision of Commonwealth benefits; the inference (in the 
absence of further details from the Explanatory Memorandum) can be made 
that this object of the Bill includes ‘identity fraud’.  An analysis of the 
effectiveness of this goal is dealt with in this part of the paper, but first, a 
brief discussion on what is meant by ‘identify fraud’. 
 
Identify fraud can be distinguished from ‘identity theft’ applying the 
following definition:133  
 
                                                                                                                                  
128  Ibid, at page 556 quoting from Parliament of Australia – Joint Select Committee on an 
Australia Card, Report of the Joint Select Committee on an Australia Card (1986) [3.7]. 
129 Ibid, at 556 quoting G de Q Walker, ‘Information as Power: Constitutional Implications of 
the Identity Numbering and ID Card Proposal’ (1986) 16 Queensland Law Society Journal 
153, 163. 
130  Ibid, at 557. 
131 Ibid, quoting G de Q Walker, ‘Information as Power: Constitutional Implications of the 
Identity Numbering and ID Card Proposal’ (1986) 16 Queensland Law Society Journal 
153, 160 -161. 
132 The Bill, s 6(1)(c). 
133 Douglas-Stewart J, ‘South Australian laws target identity theft’ [2004] PLPR 8; (2004) 10 
PLPR 167 downloaded from <http://www.austlii.edu.au//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/journals/PLPR/2004/8.html?query=identity%20fraud#disp19> and viewed 
on 7 September 2006. 
‘Identity fraud’ is often used to refer to where a perpetrator uses another person’s 
personal information, on a limited number of occasions; in a single context (for 
example, to commit credit card fraud) or in a very limited number of contexts; for 
material gain. In contrast, ‘identity theft’ is often used to refer to where a 
perpetrator uses another person’s personal information: on numerous occasions; 
over an extended period of time; in numerous contexts; for either material or non-
material gain. 
 
Using this definition, ‘identity theft’ may not result in any material gain for 
the perpetrator, and so allows prosecution without the need to prove 
‘material gain’.  Conversely, ‘identity fraud’ requires proof of material gain. 
 
The Bill does not distinguish between identity fraud and identity theft, nor 
does it provide any definitions of either.  However both types of offences 
may occur under the Access Card and the Register.  For example, identity 
fraud may occur in circumstances where a recipient of health or social 
services entitlements receives that entitlement based on false information 
about who they are.  Identity theft may occur under circumstances in which 
individual (or group) gains illegal access to the database134 and uses the 
personal information gained for either ‘material or non-material gain’.  
Given the extent of information that is required to be uploaded onto the 
Register, including ‘passwords for authenticating your identity’135 although 
‘encrypted’ may increase the occurrence of identity theft.  Even without 
access to ‘passwords’, the breadth of information stored in a single location 
will increase the chances of an unauthorised entrant to the Register (for 
example, a hacker or authorised person acting without authority) to use a 
registrants identity fraudulently.   
 
The Bill carries out the object of reducing identity fraud on the 
Commonwealth through the ‘strengthened proof of identity’ provisions 
discussed earlier, and also through the creation of offences in Divisions 3 to 
6.  For example, it is an offence to change information in the 
Commonwealth’s area of the chip in someone else’s Access Card where that 
person is not authorised to do so, or not the owner; 136 it is also an offence 
for an owner to change information in the Commonwealth part of the chip; 
137 or if it is done with the ‘intention of dishonestly obtaining an 
advantage’.138  Selling an Access Card is also an offence if it is done either 
by someone else139 or the owner. 140   
 
                                                          
134 The Commonwealth Criminal Code sets out offences and penalties associated with illegal 
access to computer databases. 
135 The Bill, section 17 Item 9(e). 
136  The Bill, s 48. 
137  The Bill, s 52. 
138  The Bill, s 51. 
139  The Bill, s 49. 
140  The Bill, s 53. 
Division 4 creates a series of offences where Access Cards have been 
unlawfully obtained; 141 dishonestly obtained; 142 or if the Access Card is 
‘false’; 143 or an unauthorised copy. 144  Division 5 relates to false or 
misleading statements in relation to the application process for registration 
or Access Card in which an applicant is under an express responsibility to 
ensure all statements are not false or misleading.  These offences do not 
require an ‘intention’ to mislead.   
 
The penalties for the offences include terms of imprisonment for 2, 5 and 10 
years, and fines of 120, 500 and 1000 penalty units.   
 
The Bill does not create any offences regarding information on the Register 
being dealt with in an unauthorised way.  However, Division 6 does create 
offences by Commonwealth officers, including the abuse of public office145 
that require the intention of dishonestly obtaining an advantage or causing 
detriment to another.  The Explanatory Memorandum146 state that ‘[a] major 
purpose of this clause is to prevent such persons using their position or 
influence to pressure an official responsible for issuing Access Cards to 
issue a card for improper purposes’.  The penalty is 10 years imprisonment 
and/or 1000 penalty units.  However, none of the offence provisions, 
including this, deal with an authorised officer viewing or scanning 
information on the Register for purposes that are not authorised.  Neither 
does the Bill require notification or reparation to ‘another’ where ‘detriment’ 
has been caused to that person. 
 
The offence provisions are mainly concerned with protecting 
Commonwealth funds from fraud (including identity fraud).  This is a proper 
pursuit and one that government if required to take.  However, there is no 
recognition or protection of rights concerning theft of an individual’s 
identity as being the responsibility of the state.  The cost here is solely upon 
the individual to protect (rather than the state), and it would appear that the 
burden would be upon the individual to pursue reclaiming their identity.   
 
How does the Bill deal with identity fraud? 
The Access Card seeks to address the issue of identity fraud by establishing 
the Register which ‘will contain … a high quality digital photograph capable 
of biometric analysis.’147 The ability to biometrically analyse the photograph 
is seen as ‘important to address identity fraud and prevent duplicate 
registrations.’ 148 
                                                          
141  The Bill, s 54. 
142  The Bill, s 55. 
143  The Bill, s 56. 
144  The Bill, s 57. 
145  The Bill, s 62. 
146  Explanatory Memorandum, at 56. 
147  KPMG, Business Case at 39. 
148  KPMG, Business Case at 39.  
 The effectiveness of facial recognition software that detects duplicate 
registrations 
IPPs 7 and 8 require that personal information collected must be accurate, 
relevant, up-to-date, complete, and not misleading; IPP 4 relates to standards 
of storage and security.  The Bill does not address how it would implement 
this principle.  In reality, the Department of Human Services may experience 
technical difficulties in complying with these information privacy principles.  
For example, for the Department to ensure the accuracy and security of the 
digital photographs, it will need to ensure that the Register does not contain 
duplicate photographs, which are false identity photographs.  Computer 
programs are available to scan through the Register and identify possible 
duplicates; however, research149 conducted on such programs indicates that 
as the Register size increases, the performance of the technology decreases 
by a significant percentage.  The result is that the program may either falsely 
detect duplicate photographs, or fail to detect where the same person has 
been placed two (or more times) on the Register.  In terms of the Access 
Card, it may mean that the Register may still allow false Access Cards to be 
issued by the Department of Human Services; or that a genuine Access 
Cardholder is incorrectly alerted to be a false cardholder.   
 
Software dealing with biometric analysis is being researched and developed, 
and might advance beyond the technology currently available in 2007.  Also, 
the choice of biometric considered the most reliable to be analysed is under 
consideration by many governments.  The prospect of iris scans150 was 
included in the KPMG Business Case, but paragraphs151 referring to it have 
been deleted from the published Business Case making them unavailable for 
comment.  Other biometrics such a voice recognition technology are also 
under consideration by Australian Government departments. 152 
 
The Access Card project is vulnerable to identity theft from a number of 
sources, for example, by outsourced partners involved in the production of 
the  Access Card; through ‘hacking’ into the Register; from access by 
Australian government employees (within the DHS, or from other agencies). 
 
Vulnerability of the Register to identity theft 
What recognition of the vulnerability of the Register does the Access Card 
initiative provide?  How would it deal with that risk? 
                                                          
149 Face Recognition Vendor Test 2002, Overview and Summary, March 2003, P. Jonathon 
Phillips, Patrick Grother, Ross J Micheals, Duane M Blackburn, Elham Tabassi, Mike 
Bone, National Institute of Standards and Technology, at 2, 3.  
150  The iris itself is a highly reliable biometric because of its stability, immutability over  
time, its complexity and the degree of variation in irises between individuals’, Justice, 
Information Resources on Identity Cards, December 2004, at 5. 
151  KPMG, Business Case, at 20, paragraph 3.7.3, and some sections deleted for   ‘Cabinet in 
confidence reasons’. 
152  Ibid, at 21. 
 
The KPMG Business Case gives this vulnerability scant recognition.  The 
only reference to this possibility is through a ‘Summary of risks’ regarding 
the progression of the Access Card project. 153  One of the risks identified, is 
that of ‘security or privacy breach’.  This is classified as having a ‘moderate’ 
consequence, but a ‘rare’ likelihood of occurring.  The KPMG Business 
Case does not address the risks beyond this general reference, and the Bill 
provides no recognition of this risk as evidenced through the failure to 
include an offence provision dealing with potential unauthorised access to 
the Register.   
 
The risk of identity theft occurring through the Register has been most 
notably recognised by interest groups responding to the proposed 
introduction of the Access Card.  Electronic Frontiers Australia comments154 
upon the proposal to ‘scan in key identity documents such as birth 
certificates which contain information often used by banks etc as a ‘secret’ 
answer’ and considers this as making a ‘mockery of the (considerably more 
security and privacy protective) Document Verification Services (‘DVS’) 
developed by the Attorney-General’s Department.’    
 
The Australian Privacy Foundation155 expressed more detailed concerns 
regarding the Register itself, in its statement:   
 
this centralized database of personal information would likely make identity fraud 
and theft worse.  This is because of a centralised system’s vulnerability to hacking, 
manipulation and corruption.  …the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [in May 
2006, speaking to the AusCert security conference] warned that the ‘Access Card’ 
proposal, if implemented, would lead to a rise in identity theft.  The proposed 
national population database, the SCRS, [the Register] would not be any more 
secure, free from corruption or immune from simple clerical errors than any other 
database… 
 
In fact, a centralised database has the potential to become a target for 
identity theft if its contents represent ‘strengthened proof of identity’. 
  
Vulnerability of the smart card to identity theft 
Similarly, there are acknowledged weaknesses in the smart card technology 
that will be used to implement the actual Access Card, as identified156 in the 
Australian Government Smartcard Framework, Smartcard Handbook. The 
major security vulnerabilities are considered to include:  direct probing, for 
example by scanning an electron microscope over the smart card to reveal its 
                                                          
153 Ibid at page 79 and table at page 88. 
154 Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission in response to the Taskforce’s Discussion 
Paper, July 2006, page 12.   
155 Australian Privacy Foundation, The ‘Access Card Proposal:  Australian Privacy 
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memory contents; ‘side channel’ attacks, which have been the subject of 
much academic and private sector research; crypto analysis; and quantum 
computing. 
 
Will it be possible to deal with internal fraud and errors? 
Recent news reports have drawn public attention to employee breaches of 
privacy concerning databases that are maintained by the Australian 
Government.  In late August 2006, ‘19 staff were sacked and 92 resigned 
after 790 cases of inappropriate accesses by Centrelink staff to client 
records.157  Soon after the Centrelink breaches of privacy, the Australian 
Taxation Office was reported to have taken action against 27 Australian 
Taxation Officer employees for breaches of privacy. 158  In this case, it was 
alleged that a number of the ‘inappropriate access to taxpayer files’ related 
to events that had occurred during the last financial year.   
 
The report highlights the need for protections offered by information privacy 
principles that relate to storage and security of information kept by 
governments.   
 
Part 5 – Conclusion and recommendations 
The introduction of the Bill within the existing Australian privacy regime 
has serious privacy implications.  The privacy implications relate to 
information that appears on the Access Card; within the microchip on the 
Access Card; and most importantly, regarding the enormous amount of 
information (both personal and sensitive) that is stored upon the Register.  
Clear lines of accountability must be established regarding all three aspects 
of the Bill.   
 
Already, the Bill creates breaches of information privacy principles provided 
for under the Privacy Act 1988.   It is likely that these breaches will lead to 
significant function creep of both the Access Card and the Register to the 
extent that it will become used for purposes beyond those relating to the 
entitlement to health and social services.  Further, the Access Card may offer 
no better protection against false health and social security claims to 
entitlement, whilst the Register has the potential for increasing identity theft.   
 
The following recommendations would provide some limited form of 
privacy protections:   
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That the Health & Social Services Smart Card Management Authority be 
reinstated by legislation to provide independent and expert oversight of the 
Access Card and the Register.  
 
That the role of the Federal Privacy Commissioner be given statutory 
recognition to ensure consistency between the Privacy Act 1988 and the 
Human Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill 2007, and to provide 
consultation and advice on all aspects that breach privacy principles.   
 
That legislation expressly specifies the limits of access to the information of 
the Access Card and expressly protects the purposes for which the personal 
information can be used, as well as the prohibited uses.   
 
That the Register be given express legislative protections including 
prohibition on data-matching; limitations upon the scanning of proof of 
identity documents; limitations on the use and disclosure of biometrics 
including the photograph; and that the offences include unauthorised access 
to, use of, and disclosure of information on the Register.   
 
That the Bill include a statutory duty regarding the security, integrity and 
accuracy of information kept on its databases, and that appropriate 
compliance and enforcement procedures be developed and implemented. 
 
The ability of a government to accumulate personal information will 
increase with the development of invasive technologies that are able to map 
and determine identifying characteristics of an individual.  In 2008, the 
Register will be able to record and store information in terms of name, 
address and limited biometrics such as a photograph.  In 2018, the 
technologies capable of recording details of information and biometrics will 
relate to, at the very least, the genetics of an individual.  Now is the time to 
consider the capabilities of the Register and the Access Card, and put in 
place legislative protections to safeguard the right to information privacy 
and the human rights that are so closely aligned to it.   
 
 
